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This paper addresses the controversy between Mayers, Lo and Chau1 on one side,
and Yuen2 on the opposite side, on whether there exist or not unconditionally
secure protocols. For such purpose, a complete classification of all possible bit
commitment protocols is given, including all possible cheating attacks. For the
simplest class of protocols (non-aborting and with complete and perfect verifica-
tion), it is shown how naturally a game-theoretical situation arises. For these
protocols, bounds for the cheating probabilities are derived, which turn out to be
different from those given in the impossibility proof1. The whole classification and
analysis has been carried out using a finite open system approach. The discrepancy
with the impossibility proof is explained on the basis of the implicit adoption of a
closed system approach—equivalent to modeling the commitment as performed by
two fixed machines interacting unitarily in a overall closed system. However, it is
shown that the closed system approach for the classification of commitment proto-
cols unavoidably leads to infinite dimensions, which then invalidate the continuity
argument at the basis of the impossibility proof.
1 Introduction
It is of practical relevance to establish if there exist secure quantum bit com-
mitment protocols, since the quantum bit commitment is a crucial element
to build up more sophisticated protocols, such as remote quantum gambling,
coin tossing, and unconditionally secure two-party quantum computation.
In the bit commitment Alice provides Bob with a piece of evidence that
she has chosen a bit b = 0, 1 which she commits to him. Later, Alice will open
the commitment, revealing the bit b to Bob, and proving that it is indeed
the committed bit with the evidence in Bob’s possession. Therefore, Alice
and Bob should agree on a protocol which satisfies simultaneously the three
requirements: (1) it must be concealing, namely Bob should not be able to
retrieve b before the opening; (2) it must be binding, namely Alice should not
be able to change b after the commitment; (3) it must be verifiable, namely
Bob must be able to check b against the evidence in his possession, according
to the rules of the protocol. In a in-principle proof of security of the com-
mitment it is supposed that both parties possess unlimited technology, e. g.
computational power, space, time, etc., and the protocol is said uncondition-
ally secure if neither Alice nor Bob can cheat with significant probability of
success as a consequence of physical laws.
In 1993, a quantum mechanical protocol was proposed3, and the uncondi-
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tional security of this protocol has been generally accepted for long time. The
insecurity of this protocol was shown by Mayers, Lo and Chau1 in 1997, where
it was recognized the possibility for Alice to cheat by entangling the commit-
ted evidence with a quantum system in her possession, and it was argued
that no unconditionally secure protocol is possible. Finally after 2000 Yuen2
presented some protocols which challenged the previous impossibility proof,
mostly on the basis of the possibility of encoding the bit on an anonymous
state given to Alice by Bob and known only to him, and suggesting the use
of decoy systems that make the protocol concealing in the limit of infinitely
many systems, with the possibility for Bob of performing his quantum mea-
surement before Alice opening, whence disputing the general availability of
EPR cheating for Alice.
In this paper, in order to provide clarifications on the controversy we
will present a classification of all possible bit commitment protocols based on
a single commitment step, analyzing the main cheating strategies for both
parties (a full derivation of the classification, the reduction of multi-step com-
mitments to a single step, and a more exhaustive analysis of cheating attacks
can be found in Ref.[4], of which the present paper is a much shorter ver-
sion). For the simplest class of protocols (non-aborting, with complete and
perfect verification) we will show how naturally a game-theoretical situation
arises. Bounds for the cheating probabilities of these protocols are presented,
which are different from those given in the impossibility proof1. In the final
discussion we will see how the discrepancy between the two opposite analysis
arises, due to the implicit adoption in the impossibility proof of a closed sys-
tem approach, equivalent to modeling the commitment as performed by two
fixed machines interacting unitarily in a overall closed system. However, it is
shown that such modeling, along with the requirement of unlimited technol-
ogy, necessarily lead to infinite dimensions, which invalidate the continuity
argument at the basis of the impossibility proof.
2 The classification of protocols
The most general bit commitment scheme with a single step is of the form: (1)
Bob prepares the Hilbert space H with the anonymous state |ϕ〉 ∈ H, and sends
H to Alice; (2) Alice modulates the value b = 0, 1 of the committed bit on the
anonymous state |ϕ〉 and sends the output back to Bob. The bit modulation
is a quantum operation (QO) M(b) parametrized by b. Such scheme contains
all possibilities, including Yuen’s protocols2, and the protocols considered by
Mayers, Lo and Chau1, which correspond to openly known |ϕ〉. In general the
output Hilbert space K of the QO will be different from H, since Alice can
send back to Bob a quantum system different from what he sent to her.
In Ref.[4] a complete classifications of all possible protocols is derived, on
the basis of the fact that since Alice has unlimited technology, she can always
achieve the encoding QO’s M(b) of the committed bit value b via a perfect pure
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measurement. For non aborting protocols, this corresponds to the following
QO’s
M(b)(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|) = TrF⊗P[U (b)(|ϕ〉〈ϕ| ⊗ |ω〉〈ω|A ⊗ ρP)U (b)†], (2.1)
where A is the preparation ancilla/decoy Hilbert space prepared in the state
|ω〉; F is the measurement ancilla Hilbert space on which Alice performs a
complete von Neumann measurement, and we have that K ⊗ F ≃ H ⊗ A;
P is the space of the secret parameter, say j, which is needed in order to
make the protocol concealing and at the same time verifiable (so that the
modulation is actually a choice between two ensembles of QO’s {M(b)j } for
b = 0, 1). Therefore, the best option for Alice is to achieve the encoding
QO by preparing the ancilla/decoy state |ω〉A ∈ A, performing the unitary
transformation U (b) on H⊗A, making a complete von Neumann measurement
on F, with outcome say i, and finally send K to Bob. The partial trace on F⊗P
on the basis {|i〉 ⊗ |j〉}, which describes Alice’s measurement, corresponds to
the Kraus decompositions M(b) =
∑
ji pjE
(b)
ji · E(b)ji †, where j is the secret
parameter and i is the secret outcome, and the probabilities pj = 〈j|ρP|j〉 for
j will depend on the preparation ρP. In a protocol which is completely and
perfectly verifiable Alice tells b, j and i to Bob, who verifies the state E
(b)
ji |ϕ〉.
Since the local QO’s on K and F ⊗ P commute, Alice has the possibility of:
(1) first sending K to Bob; (2) then performing the measurement on F ⊗ P
at the very last moment of the opening. As we will see, this is the basis for
Alice EPR cheating attacks. Notice that strictly trace-decreasing QO’s—i. e.
aborting protocols—pose limitations to Alice’s EPR cheating. In fact, Alice
cannot delay the abortion of the protocol at the opening, and must declare it
at the commitment. Since both secret parameters j and i can be conveniently
measured by Alice, they can be treated on equal footings as a single parameter
J ≡ (j, i). With the notation E(b)J
.
=
√
pjE
(b)
ji ∈ B(H,K), the maps write
M(b)(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|) =
∑
j
pjM
(b)
j (|ϕ〉〈ϕ|) =
∑
J
E
(b)
J |ϕ〉〈ϕ|E(b)J †, (2.2)
3 Cheating
For a discussion of all possibilities of cheating see Ref. [4]. Here we analyze
the only the useful attacks by both Alice and Bob.
Alice cheating. After the commitment and before the opening Alice can
try to cheat by performing a unitary transformation V on F ⊗ P: this is the
so-called EPR attack. Without changing the QO’s M(b), the maneuver will
change their Kraus decompositions—which are relevant at the opening—as
{E(b)J } → {E(b)J (V )}, keeping the cardinality, in the following way
E
(b)
J (V ) =
∑
L
E
(b)
L VJL, VJL = 〈J |V |L〉. (3.3)
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The probability that Alice can cheat successfully in pretending having
committed, say, b = 1, whereas she committed b = 0 instead, is given by
PAc (V, ϕ) =
∑
J
|〈ϕ|E(0)J †(V )E(1)J |ϕ〉|2
||E(1)J ϕ||2
, (3.4)
and depends on the anonymous state |ϕ〉 and on the cheating transformation
V . Without any knowledge of |ϕ〉, the best that Alice can do is to adopt a
conservative strategy, by maximizing her probability of cheating in the worst
case, corresponding to the minimax choice of V
(PAc )µ
.
= max
V
min
ϕ
PAc (V, ϕ). (3.5)
It is evident that in this way a game theoretical situation arises, in which Bob
choses |ϕ〉 and Alice choses V , with the probability P (V, ϕ) playing the role
of a payoff matrix. The actual game situation is more complicated—due for
example to Bob cheating—and will be analyzed elsewhere.
Bob cheating. Bob can try to cheat by making the best discrimination
between the two maps M(b) =
∑
j pjM
(b)
j . However, since he doesn’t know the
probabilities pj actually used by Alice, his strategy will be suboptimal, and
his actual cheating probability PBc will be lower than the probability (P
B
c )opt
corresponding to the optimal strategy with the right probabilities pj . Since
map-discrimination is generally more reliable with the map acting locally on
an entangled state5, instead of preparing |ϕ〉 ∈ H Bob prepares an entangled
state on H⊗ R and sends only H to Alice. Therefore, for equally probable bit
values b = 0, 1, Bob’s optimal probability of cheating is bounded as follows4
PBc ≤ (PBc )opt =
1
2
+
1
4
∣∣∣∣∣∣M(1) −M(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
, (3.6)
where ||·||cb denotes the completely bounded (CB) norm.
Bounds for cheating probabilities. If the protocol is perfectly con-
cealing the CB-norm in Eq. (3.6) is zero, and the two maps are the same,
whence the their Kraus are connected via a unitary transformation V on
F⊗ P, and Alice can cheat with probability one. Let’s consider now the case
in which Bob’s optimal probability of cheating (PBc )opt is infinitesimally close
to 12 , namely ||M(1) −M(0)||cb = ε. Notice that generally ε is vanishing for in-
creasing dimension of K (such as when the approximately concealing condition
is achieved for increasingly large number of decoy systems2), and no obvious
continuity argument can be invoked to assert that Alice cheating probability
will approach unit for vanishing ε. More precisely, in the present context the
continuity argument of Ref. [1] would imply that
1− (PAc )µ = ω
(∣∣∣∣∣∣M(1) −M(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
)
, lim
ε→0
ω(ε) = 0 (3.7)
with the function ω(ε) independent on the dimension of K. However, using
anonymous states such assertion may turn out to be false. In fact, it is obvious
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that if there is an alternate Kraus decomposition {E(0)J (V )} for the map M(0)
such that the two Kraus {E(0)J (V )} and {E(1)J } are close, then the protocol is
approximately concealing and not binding, since4
(PBc )opt −
1
2
=
1
4
∣∣∣∣∣∣M(1) −M(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
≤ 1
2
√√√√∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J
∣∣∣E(0)J (V )− E(1)J ∣∣∣2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣, (3.8)
PAc (V, ϕ) ≥
[
1− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J
∣∣∣E(0)J (V )− E(1)J ∣∣∣2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
]2
, (3.9)
where for any operator A we use the customary abbreviation |A|2 .= A†A.
However, the impossibility proof would be true if a bound of the form (3.8)
would be satisfied in the reverse direction, in which case one would have
1− (PAc )µ,av ≤ min
V
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
J
∣∣∣E(0)J (V )− E(1)J ∣∣∣2
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ω
(∣∣∣∣∣∣M(1) −M(0)∣∣∣∣∣∣
cb
)
, (3.10)
which would correspond to the following continuity argument: if two CP maps
are close in CB-norm, then for a given fixed Kraus decomposition for one of the
two maps, there is always an alternate Kraus decomposition for the other map
such that the two are close. Since as regards the cheating probabilities we have
considered only the case of non-aborting protocols with perfect-verification,
proving the continuity argument (3.10) or directly the bound (3.7) would
means that a secure protocol can still be searched outside such class of proto-
cols. On the other hand, finding a counterexample to Eq. (3.7) would provide
a perfectly verifiable and unconditionally secure protocol.
4 Discussion
The discrepancy between the previous analysis and the analysis beneath the
impossibility proof1 is essentially due to the fact that the latter is based on
the assumption that the starting state of the commitment protocol is openly
known, in the sense that the probability distribution of the state is given, and
then the corresponding mixed state can be purified. The general underlying
idea is that the protocol should be processed by machines, and therefore all
probability distributions are defined, and purified inside the machines. How-
ever, such an assumption is certainly not realistic for a cryptographic protocol,
where each party has actually the freedom of changing or tuning the machine,
namely chosing any desired probability distribution. One can continue to
argue on this line, asserting that changing the machine is equivalent to use
a larger machine. However, this will be equivalent to consider infinite ma-
chines, corresponding to uniform probabilities on infinite sets, and this would
invalidate an impossibility proof based on a non proved continuity argument.
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The above hill-posed mathematical framework arises from the Bayesian
approach to secret parameters, dictated from the closed system modeling with
fixed machines and purification of probabilities. Alternative to the previous
approach, we have the realistic finite open system approach, in which unknown
parameters are treated as such, without the need of any a priori probability
distribution, in which we can address the problem for finite dimension with
the parameter ε depending on it. Then, if one proceeds by treating unknown
parameters as such, no openly known state can be assumed, and the anony-
mous state encoding of Yuen2 leads to the present classification of protocols.
Notice that if the initial state |ϕ〉 is openly known, then for that given fixed
states all QO’s can be regarded as random unitary transformations (since all
states are connected by unitary transformations), and this lead to the sim-
ple form of Alice cheating probability in terms of fidelities1, whereas in the
present context the probability of cheating has the more involved form (3.4),
due to the fact that the state |ϕ〉 is unknown, and that there are QO’s that
don’t admit random unitary Kraus decompositions.
Finally, regarding the possibility of aborting protocols, one could always
reasonably adopt equivalent protocols which don’t abort, since the repeated
commitment will eventually be successful. However, such kind of protocols
will necessarily be infinite convex combinations of protocols on infinite dimen-
sional anonymous spaces H, and again one the closed system approach would
necessarily lead to infinite dimensions.
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